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directive provides no express protection for the four state interests which were
balanced against Perlmutter's constitutional right of privacy. Protection of the
state's interests in preserving life and prohibiting suicide, along with upholding
the right of self-determination is essential to prevent a demeaning of the sanctity
of individual lives.
The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized a qualified constitutional
right of privacy for patients rejecting life-sustaining treatment. The limitations
on this right must be clarified to protect the urgent state interests which the
court acknowledges. The court has placed the responsibility on the legislature to
provide a procedure for honoring a patient's right of privacy. Until the
legislature acts, patients may be forced to seek court orders based on their
individual situations, as they wait to die.
LINDA NELL FLEWELLEN

PATENT LAW - PATENTABILITY OF
MICRO-ORGANISMS - WHAT NEXT?

Diamondv. Chakrabarty,100 S.Ct. 2204 (1980)
Respondent, a microbiologist,1 developed a strain of bacteria capable of
breaking down multiple components of crude oil. 2 Believing that the bacteria
had significant value for the treatment of oil spills,3 the respondent sought
patent protection for the process which developed the organism, and for the
organism itself.4 The examiner granted the patent application for the process, 5
1. 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2205 (1980). Respondent Chakrabarty is a microbiologist employed by
the General Electric Company. The patent application involved has been assigned to the
General Electric Company. Id.
2. Id. at 2205 n.l. Respondent discovered that the degradation abilities of certain bacteria
were controlled by "plasmids." Each plasmid was capable of breaking down one component
of crude oil. However, no natural strain of bacteria contains more than one type of plasmid.
Dr. Chakrabarty's invention consisted of a genetically engineered strain of Pseudomonas into
which four different plasmids, capable of degrading four different oil components, have been
inserted. Id.
3. Id. at 2206 n.2. Prior to the invention in the instant case, it was necessary to employ
several different strains of bacteria to biologically control oil spills. Due to various reasons,
only a portion of the mixed cultures would survive to attack the oil spill. Dr. Chakrabarty's
micro-organism contains the plasmids necessary to attack the major components of crude oil.
Without the inhibitive qualities of the various natural strains of bacteria, Dr. Chakrabarty's
invention attacks the oil spill much more rapidly and efficiently than any natural strain of
bacteria. Id.
4. Prior attempts to stabilize more than one transferred plasmid within a cell had failed.
Dr. Chakrabarty's process solved this problem by fusing two or more plasmids with DNAcleaving radiation. See Brief for Respondent at 2-6, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204
(1980).
5. 35 U.S.C. §101 (1976) provides patent protection for "[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter .. " See Philip
Sitton Septic Tank Co. v. Honer, 274 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1959) (process patents distinct from
product patents and either may stand or fall independently of each other).
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but rejected the daim for the organism itself.6 The examiner's rejection was
affirmed by the Patent Office Board of Appeals on the grounds that living things
were not patentable subject matter within 35 U.S.C. §101.7 On appeal, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) reversed the decision of the
Board and held that the fact an organism was alive was not legally significant
in regard to the patent laws. 9 On certiorari,10 the United States Supreme Court
affirmed. and HELD, a live, human-made organism was patentable subject
matter within 35 U.S.C. §101.11
Tide 35 U.S.C. §10112 provides for the issuance of a patent for the invention
or discovery of "any new and useful... manufacture or composition of matter."1 3 The statute was adopted to promote the introduction of new processes
and products into the economy.' 4 In response to the general belief that plants
were not patentable under the statute,15 Congress also enacted the Plant Patent
6. 100 S. Ct. at 2206. The examiner rejected the claim on two grounds: (1) that microorganisms are "products of nature," and (2) that as living things they are not patentable
subject matter under 35 U..C. §101. Id.
7. Id. at 2206 n.3. The Board concluded that the bacteria were not "products of nature"
because they were not naturally-occurring. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text, infra.
8. A patent applicant whose claim has been rejected twice may appeal the decision of
the primary examiner to the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. 35 U.S.C. §134
(1976). This decision may in turn be appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
[C.C.P.A.] or to the District Court of Columbia for a civil action against the Commissioner of
Patents. 35 U.S.C. §§141, 145 (1976).
9. In re Chakrabarty, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The instant case was decided earlier
by the C.C.P.A., 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978), where it was reversed on the authority of the
prior decision in In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Bergy was subsequently xemanded
by the United States Supreme Court "for further consideration in light of Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584 (1978)." 438 U.S. 902 (1978). The C.C.P.A. then vacated its earlier decision in the
instant case and consolidated the case with Bergy for reconsideration. After re-examining
both cases, the C.C.PA. reaffirmed its earlier decision. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). See Note,
Patent Law-Patenting of Life Forms-Microorganisms More Akin to Inanimate Chemical
Compositions And Useful As Industrial Tools Are Not Excluded From Categories of Patentable Subject Matter Merely Because They Are Alive - In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, vacated,
No. 77-535 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. granted, vacated
and remanded,98 S. Ct. 319 (1978), 47 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 242 (1978).
10. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Bergy and the instant case. 100 S. Ct.
261 (1979). Bergy has since been dismissed as moot, 100 S. Ct. 697 (1980), leaving only the
instant case for decision.
11. 100 S. Ct. at 2206. The Supreme Court held that the terms "manufacture" and
"composition of matter" encompass living organisms. Id. at 2212.
12. 35 U.S.C. §101 (1976). The first patent law was passed in 1790. Act of April 10, 1790,
ch. 7, §1, 1 Stat. 109. Although the Patent Act was amended, revised or codified some 50 times
between 1790 and 1950, the language ofothe 1790 Act has remained virtually unchanged. See

1 A.

DELLER, DELIER'S WALKuR ON PATERNTS

§§12-13 (2d ed. 1964). Throughout this comment,

references to §101 will encompass its predecessor statutes as well.
13. 35 U.S.C. §101 (1976).
14. U.S. CONsr, art. 1, §8, cl. 8. The Constitution grants Congress the broad legislative
power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
15. The reason protection was not available under the existing patent statute was not
explicitly discussed. It appears that the organic nature of plants was presumed to present insoluble problems in satisfying the statutory description requirement of the invention now
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17
Act of 1930,16 affording protection to certain asexually reproduced plants,' and
the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970,11 extending similar protection to
20
sexually reproduced plants.19 Since there is no common law of patents, these
statutes define the entire realm of patentable subject matter. Patent claims for
bacteria have been judicially determined to be outside the scope of the 1930
Act, 21 and are expressly excluded by Congress from the protection of the 1970
Act; 22 therefore, any claims involving micro-organisms must fall within the
23
subject matter defined in section 101 to be patentable.
The first patent claims involving living matter arose at the beginning of the
twentieth century. 2 ' Although protection was allowed for processes employing
micro-organisms -5 and for purification of natural compositions such as adrenalin, 2 6 the patent system was reluctant to grant patent protection for living
matter.2 7 The first case involving a patent for living matter reached the Supreme

codified in 35 U.S.C. §112, which excluded them from potential categorization as inventions.
See Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123 (1889). See note 27 and accompanying text,
infra; note 42 infra.
16. 35 U.S.C. §161 (1976).
17. Id. The Act provides: "Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any
distinct and new variety of plant... other than a tuber propagated plant ... may obtain a
patent therefor .. "
18. 7 U.S.C. §2402(a) (1970).
19. Id. The Act provides: "The breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant
(other than fungi, bacteria, or first generation hybrids) who has so reproduced the variety ...
shall be entitled to plant variety protection .... The protection granted sexually reproduced
plants is in the form of a certificate, similar to a patent. 7 U.S.C. §2485 (1970).
20. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964). "The grant of a patent is
a statutory monopoly; indeed, patent rights exist only by virtue of statute." Id. (quoting
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834)).
21. In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940). Although noting that "plants" might
scientifically include bacteria, the Court stated: "[W]e think that Congress, in the use of the
word 'plant,' was speaking 'in the common language of the people,' and did not use the word
in its strict scientific sense." Id. at 838. It has been suggested that Arzberger should no longer
be followed because it inhibits advancements in the field of microbiology. See generally
Cooper, Arzberger Under the Microscope: A Critical Reexamination Of the Exclusion of
Bacteria From Plant Patent Protection,7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTER TECH. & L. 367 (1980).
22. 7 U.S.C. §2402(a) (1976). See note 18 supra.
23. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text, supra.
24. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), modified, 196
F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (claim for purified hormone extract from glandular tissue); Cameron
Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 209 U.S.
548 (1908) (use of bacteria in sewage purification); Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123
(1889) (patent claim for fiber of needle of Pinus australis tree).
25. Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453, 463 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 209 U.S. 548 (1908) (the use of anaerobic bacteria in sewage purification upheld
as patentable use of one of the agencies of nature for a practical purpose).
26. Parke-Davis Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), modified,
196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (patent claim for adrenalin as a purification of a natural composition of matter held valid as claiming a new thing commercially and therapeutically).
27. The courts did not directly address the issue of whether living matter was by definition
unpatentable. Claims for patents were denied for failure to meet other statutory requirements.
See Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123 (1889). In Latimer a patent claim for plant
fibers was rejected for failure to meet written description requirements, however, the Coin-
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Court in 1981.28 A claim was presented for oranges whose rind had been impregnated with borax to prevent mold.29 The Supreme Court, pointing to a
lack of change in the general character of the fruit, denied the claim for failure
to show sufficient modification to constitute a new "manufacture" within the
meaning of the patent laws.30
3
In Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co., 1 the Supreme Court

used a different approach to decide whether living organisms were patentable.
The Court invalidated a patent claim for a previously unavailable mixture of
bacterial strains.3 2 Rather than relying on the language of the statute, the Court
viewed the discovery of the nonprohibitive qualities of bacteria as a discovery
of a mere "product of nature" and therefore unpatentable 3 This position reflected the Court's general proscription against the patentability of "natural
phenomena." 3 The rationale underlying this proscription was that patent
monopolies granted for basic principles of nature would restrict future ad6
vances in technology35 and frustrate the constitutional purpose of patentss
mission of Patents noted that the claim was unpatentable as directed to a "product of
nature." Id. at 125.
28. American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
29. Id. at 6-7. The invention in this case prolonged the marketable life of the fruit beyond
what had been previously possible. By treating the rind of the fruit with borax, the fruit was
rendered resistant to blue mold decay. Id.
g0. Id. at 11-13. The Court focused on the statutory language and required more than
just a change to constitute a "manufacture." The Court stated: "[a]ddition of borax to the
rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material an article for use which possesses
a new and distinctive form, quality or property." Id. at 11.
31. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
32. Id. at 130-31. The claim involved the use of a combination of various strains of rootnodule bacteria for innoculating leguminous plants. Previous combinations had been unsuccessful because the bacteria produced an inhibitory effect on each other when combined
in a common base. See Comment, Patentability of Discovery of Principles of Nature: Funk
Bros. v. Kalo, 31 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 784 (1949). The facts of the instant case involve a similar
problem regarding the inhibitive qualities of bacterial strains when combined. The solution
created by Dr. Chakrabarty in the instant case is somewhat more complex, involving the development of a new bacterium rather than the combination of naturally existing strains. See
notes 2-3 supra.
33. 333 U.S. at 130. "Bond does not create a state of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the
bacteria. Their qualities are the work of nature." Id. In relying upon the purpose of the
patent laws to limit patentable subject matter, the Court departed from its previous approach in American Fruit Growers. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text, supra.
34. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853) (telegraph inventor's broad claim
to use of electric current denied as monopolizing a principle of nature); Le Roy v. Tathum,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852) (patent claim for improvement in machinery based on the discovery that lead could be forced under pressure into pipes, rather than cast, denied as monop.
olizing a natural phenomenon).
35. Le Roy v. Tathum, 55 U.S. (14. How.) 156, 175 (1852). "A patent is not good for an
effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would prohibit all other persons from making
the same thing by any means whatsoever. This . . . would discourage arts and manufactures,
against the avowed policy of the patent laws." Id.
56. See note 14 supra. Claims for the application of natural phenomena have consistently been allowed. See MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. RCA, 306 U.S. 86, 94, (1939). "While
a scientific truth . . . is not patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with
the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be." Id. See also O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15
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Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion37 criticized the "product of nature" test applied by the Court as overbroad but found the claim invalid for
failure to satisfy statutory requirements. 38
Although the proscription against patenting natural phenomena continued
to be applied to abstract ideas and scientific principles, 39 its corollary, the
"product of nature" test, lapsed into disuse for patent claims involving living
organisms.

40

With the codification of the patent laws in 1952,'41 lower courts

relied more on statutory requirements such as the written description requirement of section 11242 to determine the validity of patent claims involving living
organisms. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals went so far as to discard the
"product of nature" test when the statutory requirements were met.43 The

C.C.P.A., however, acknowledged the applicability of the test to process claims
employing living organisms and commented that the doctrine might bar the
4
patentability of the micro-organisms.4
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position on the patentability of natural
phenomena in a series of cases rejecting patent applications for computer programs. In Gottschalk v. Benson 45 the Court held that computer programs, as
phenomena of nature, were basic tools of science and therefore unpatentable.46
How.) 156 (1852) (process implementing electric current for telegraph held patentable). In
Funk Bros., however, the Court held that once the secret of the non-inhibitive quality of the
,bacterial strains was discovered and treated as the state of the art, the production of the
innoculant was a simple step insufficient to constitute an invention. 333 U.S. at 132.
37. Id. at 134-35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 133, 135. Justice Frankfurter remarked that the "product of nature" test could
be employed to challenge almost every patent. Justice Frankfurter invalidated the claim on
grounds that it could not adequately be identified. Id. at 133.
39. See Davison Chem. Corp. v. Joliet Chems., Inc., 179 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1950) (discovery
of principle that temperature of water controls size of pore and density of silica gel not
patentable); Youngs Rubber Corp. v. Allied Latex Corp., 188 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.) (testing
method for thin rubber article dependent upon natural qualities of mandrel insufficient to
constitute an invention), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).
40. See 20 CATH. U. L. REv. 783 (1971). See notes 41-44 and accompanying text, infra.

41. 35 US.C. §§1-293 (1952).
42. 35 U.S.C. §112 (1976) requires a written description of the invention sufficient to
enable one skilled in the applicable field to practice it. Also widely used were 35 U.S.C. §102
(1976), which requires all patentable inventions to be "novel," and 35 U.S.C. §103 (1976)
which requires that an invention be "non-obvious" in relation to the prior art.
43. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 1958)
(claim for purified vitamin B-12 upheld as valid). The Merck court stated that unpatentable
products have been frequently characterized as "products of nature." But where the requirements of the Patent Act are met, patents upon "products of nature" are granted and their
validity sustained. Id. See 27 GEo. WASH. L. Ruv. 256 (1958).
44. In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (claim to process employing microorganism to produce antibiotic upheld as valid). The Mancy court cautioned in dicta that
applicants would be unable to obtain a claim for the micro-organism, because the microorganism, "while new in the sense that it is not shown by any art of record, is, as we understand it, a 'product of nature.' " Id. at 1294.
45. 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (applicant sought protection for new method of programming
digital computers).
46. Id. at 67. The Court found that a patent for a programming method would monopolize the formula and effectively constitute a patent on the formula itself. Id. at 71-72.
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The Court stated, however, that computer programs were not per se unpatentable, but that the technological problems in this area were best managed by
47
committees of Congress.
The Court's position in Benson was strengthened and expanded in Parker
v. Flook4s where the Court rejected a claim for a process employing a computer
program. 49 Prior case law,50 including Benson, had established that an invention applying natural phenomena in a new and useful process constituted
patentable subject matter. The Flook Court abandoned that approach and
focused on the patentability of the formula itself, rather than the process employing the formula. 51 Thus, after Flook, any claim too closely related to natural phenomena could be rejected as an attempt to obtain protection for the
phenomenon itself.52 Flook reaffirmed the Court's conservative approach in
Benson concerning the extension of patent rights to new and complex fields of
technology.5 3 The Court expressed the need for caution in extending patent
protection to areas wholly unforeseen by Congress. 54
Like computer technology, microbiology is a new and complex field. With
the recent advances in microbiology, more claims are meeting the statutory requirements which previously barred the patentability of micro-organisms.55
The instant case marked the first time these requirements were met and the
Court was asked to determine whether living matter was per se unpatentable.r 6
The instant Court held that the language in section 101 encompassed the
micro-organism developed by the respondent.57 The majority based its decision
on the plain meaning of the statutory language and found that the broad purpose of the patent laws required a broad construction of section 101.58 In
47. Id. at 72-73. It has been suggested that the Court may have been inconsistent here
because earlier in the opinion the Court stated that its decision did not preclude a patent for
any computer program. Id. at 71. See Note, Parker v. Flook and Computer Program Patents,
30 HAsr. L.J. 1627, 1632-33 (1979).
48. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
49. Id. at 585-86. Flook's claim consisted of a method for updating alarm limits during
catalytic conversion processes. The only novel feature of the claim was a mathematical
formula. Id.
50. See notes 29-38, 44-46 and accompanying text, supra.
51. 437 U.S. at 593.
52. See, e.g., In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (applying Flook).
53. 437 U.S. at 596.
54. This expresion of caution leaves some doubt about the availability of patent protection for inventions involving sophisticated new technologies, at least until Congress addresses
the issue. See Note, Bergy, Flook and Micro-organisms as Patentable Products, 29 CATH. U. L.
REv. 485, 496 (1980).
55. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (claim for biologically pure culture of a
previously unknown micro-organism useful in producing an antibiotic upheld as patentable
subject matter). See note 9 supra. See Comment, The Patentabilityof Living Organisms Under
35 U.S.C. §101: In re Bergy, 91 HAsv. L. REv. 1357 (1978).
56. The instant case did not involve the novelty and non-obviousness conditions of 35
U.S.C. §§102 and 103, respectively. 100 S. Ct. at 2207 n.5.
57. Id. at 2207-08. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens joined. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices White, Marshall and Powell joined.
58. Id. at 2208-10. The majority noted that §101 was limited only by the Court's general
proscription against natural phenomena. Id. at 2208.
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reaching this decision, the majority rejected the applicability of the Plant
Patent Acts as an aid in interpreting section 101.5 9 The majority also refused to
interpret Flook as barring the patentability of subject matter in unforeseen
areas, reasoning that to do so would frustrate the purpose of the patent laws. 0
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent,61 criticized the Court's interpretation of the applicable legislation and its disdain for the warning in Flook.62
The dissent viewed the 1930 and 1970 Acts as indicative of Congress' intent
that, without specific legislation, living organisms were not patentable63 The
dissent would have left the decision to broaden or narrow the reach of the
64
patent laws to Congress.
The instant Court relied upon the literal interpretation of the statute to
preclude any restriction of section 101.6 5 The approach of the instant Court
contradicted the basic principle of statutory construction that in the absence of
evidence that Congress intended a special or technical use, terms employed by
Congress must be construed consistent with their everyday meaning.66 For
instance, although terms may have extensive scientific definitions, the courts
have held that Congress intended a more limited, common understanding of
the terms.6 7There is no doubt that "manufacture" and "composition of matter" are extremely broad terms, 68 but it is difficult to perceive how they can
59. Id. at 2208-10. The majority viewed this legislation as a reaction to the general presumption that plants are not amenable to a written description nor patentable as products of
nature. This presumption was founded upon the decision in Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec.
Com. Pat. 123 (1889). Id. at 2209. See notes 15 and 27 and accompanying text, supra.
60. Id. at 2211. The majority acknowledged the public concern with genetic engineering.
However, the Court remarked that these policy considerations are best left to Congress which
is free to amend the patent laws as it sees fit. Id. at 2212.
61. Id. at 2212-13 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall and Powell, JJ., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2213 n.2.
63. Id. at 2214. The dissent pointed to the express exclusion of bacteria from the 1970
Act as an indication that Congress considered the patentability of bacteria and specifically
excluded it from protection. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2210. The Court stated: "[We] should not read into the patent laws limitations
and conditions which the Legislature has not expressed." Id. at 2207 (quoting United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933)).
66. Patent statutes should not be interpreted "to extend by judicial construction the
rights and privileges which it was the purpose of Congress to bestow." Bauer & Cie v.
O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913). Cf. Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467,
469 (2d Cir. 1908) (patent claim for system of cash-registering and accounting could not be
considered an art) (dicta), noted in Comment, supra note 55, at 1361.
67. See In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (court concluded that, although the
term "plants" might include bacteria scientifically, the common understanding of the term
did not include bacteria).
68. 100 S. Ct. at 2207. The term "manufacture," as defined by the Court means "the
production of articles for use from raw materials prepared by giving to these materials new
forms, qualities, properties or combinations whether by hand labor or by machinery" (quoting
American Fruit Growers Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)). Id. The majority defined
"composition of matter" to include "all compositions of two or more substances and . . . all
composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture,
or whether they be gases, fluids, powders, or solids" (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149
F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.C. 1957)). Id.
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reasonably include living organisms. The common understanding of the terms
appears to foreclose a purely literal reading of the statute.
While the Court emphasized the broad purpose of section 101, no evidence
69
was offered that the statute was intended to include living organisms. In fact,
°
the legislative history of the Plant Patent Acts strongly supported- the conclusion that Congress had assumed legislation would be necessary to make living
organisms patentable.7 1 If section 101 wasintended to include living organisms,
then the Plant Patent Acts were unnecessary. This contravenes the traditional
72
notion that Congress does not enact useless law. The majority rejected this
argument but did not explain why the Acts were necessary. 73
By holding that the language in section 101 was restricted only by express
authorization from Congress, the Court ignored the reasoning used in analogous
cases related to inventions from new and complex fields.7 4 In prior decisions,
the Court expressed a need for caution when extending patent protection to
areas unforeseen by Congress, especially when complex policy considerations
were involved.7 5 Further, in the instant case, the inherent problems associated
with genetic research and patentability of micro-organisms have been considered
by Congress but not resolved.7 6 The instant decision has thrown caution to the
69. See 100 S.Ct. at 2208-09. The Court's position was based upon the absence of evidence
that Congress intended to exclude living organisms. Id.
70. While the legislative history of the Plant Patent Act is not part of the legislative
history of §101, it is entitled to consideration "as a secondarily authoritative expression of
expert opinion" as to the interpretation of §101. Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 231,
237 n.18 (5th Cir. 1969).

71. A letter from the Secretary of Agriculture noted that "the patent laws . . .at the
present time are understood to cover only inventions or discoveries in the field of inanimate
nature." S. PP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 App. A (1930); H. R. REP. No. 1129, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1930), cited in Comment, supra note 55, at 1362.
72. See Comment, supra note 55, at 1362. See also 100 S.Ct. at 2214 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Platt v. Union Pacific R.R., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1878) (the rules of statutory construction
declare that a legislature is presumed to have used no superfluous words); In re Finch, 535
F.2d 70, 71 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (it cannot be assumed that Congress did a useless thing).
73. 100 S.Ct. at 2208-10. The majority read the legislation as an attempt to overcome the
belief that plants, as products of nature, were unpatentable and not susceptible to written description. If artificially produced plants were believed to be unpatentable products of nature
in the absense of specific legislation, artificially produced micro-organisms should likewise require legislation to be patentable. If the Act was necessary to solve the technical problem of
description, this could have been accomplished by an amendment to the description requirements, making most of the Act, particularly its limitation to asexually reproduced plants,
unnecessary. Id. at 2213 nA (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. The cases involving computer programs addressed patent questions involving inventions in new and complex technological fields. See generally Novick & Wallenstein, The
Algorithm and Computer Software Patentability:A Scientific View Of a Legal Problem, 7
RtrrzaEs J. Comrr=m TECH. &L. 313 (1980). See notes 45-53 and accompanying text, supra.
75. E.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram

Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (warning against expansion of rights not previously deemed
to be protected by patent laws).
76. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§2321-2583 (1970), excludes
bacteria from its coverage, indicating that Congress has included bacteria within its consideration but has not resolved the dilemma. 100 S.Ct. at 2214 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Testifying before a Senate subcommittee drafting legislation to set down minimum safety
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